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HY DO WE THINK IN MORAL AND EVALUATIVE terms 
(i.e., have moral and evaluative beliefs)? According to some 
philosophers, it is just because such thinking conferred a fitness 
advantage on our ancestors (i.e., helped them to survive and reproduce) 
and we have inherited this disposition. It is not because the things that we 
morally or evaluatively believe are ever true and we are apprehending or 
otherwise responding to these truths.1 
In their article, “The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical 
Reason,”2 Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer argue that while 
many common moral and evaluative beliefs can indeed be evolutionarily 
debunked in this way – for instance, the belief that incest between 
consenting adult siblings is morally wrong – at least one belief cannot be 
so debunked. This is belief in the following principle: 
 
The Principle of Universal Benevolence (UB): each one [of us] is morally 
bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, except in 
so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly 
knowable or attainable by him.3 
 
The heart of UB is a claim about what is good simpliciter: equal amounts of 
wellbeing are worth equally much, no matter whose they are. 
Why can belief in UB not be debunked by evolutionary 
considerations? It is because, say de Lazari-Radek and Singer, such a belief 
would have been no assistance to any of our ancestors in the race to survive 
and reproduce. On the contrary, it would have been an evolutionary 
hindrance, for it would have inclined one to devote one’s time and 
resources to promoting the survival and reproduction of beings other than 
oneself and one’s close kin. 
Why, then, do we (or at least many of us) believe UB? According to 
de Lazari-Radek and Singer, a better explanation of this belief is that it is a 
byproduct of our capacity to reason, which itself was fitness-enhancing. 
They write: 
 
[We] might have become reasoning beings because that enabled us to solve a 
variety of problems that would otherwise have hampered our survival, but once 
                                                
1 See R. Joyce (2007) The Evolution of Morality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, ch. 6; S. Street 
(2006) “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” Philosophical Studies 127: 
109-66. 
2 K. de Lazari-Radek and P. Singer (2012) “The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of 
Practical Reason,” Ethics 123: 9-31. 
3 Ibid.: 17. This formulation of the principle is due to H. Sidgwick (1907) The Methods of 
Ethics, 7th ed. (London: Macmillan). De Lazari-Radek and Singer’s piece is organized 
around two puzzles raised in Sidgwick’s Methods. For brevity, I omit discussion here of 
their interesting claims about Sidgwick’s own views on these matters. 
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we are capable of reasoning, we may be unable to avoid recognizing and 
discovering some truths that do not aid our survival.4 
 
Having made this case for UB, de Lazari-Radek and Singer move swiftly to 
a dramatic conclusion: utilitarianism is true. By utilitarianism, they mean 
the view that there is just one ultimate source of normative reasons for 
action – wellbeing, whosever it is – and so “we ought to maximize well-being 
generally.”5 
In his piece, “Evolution and Impartiality,”6 Guy Kahane responds to 
de Lazari-Radek and Singer. According to Kahane, even if de Lazari-Radek 
and Singer are right that debunking arguments succeed against all beliefs 
that conflict with belief in UB, but not against belief in UB itself, we can 
nonetheless evolutionarily debunk our core beliefs about the nature of wellbeing – 
in particular the beliefs that pleasure is good for us and pain is bad for us. 
It is obvious, Kahane says, that we have these beliefs about the nature of 
wellbeing only due to their usefulness to our ancestors. He writes: “if any 
normative belief can be given such an explanation, it is the universal (or 
near-universal) conviction that pain is bad [for us].”7 
Why is this supposed to pose a problem for the argument of de Lazari-
Radek and Singer? It is a problem, Kahane says, because it would mean 
that the sort of utilitarianism they vindicate is “entirely idle.”8 This is 
because it would be one on which we can have no idea what to maximize.  
Kahane adds that some beliefs about wellbeing might well survive 
debunking attempts, but only counterintuitive ones like that wellbeing 
consists in: 
 
ascetic contemplation of deep philosophical truths, or celibate spiritual 
communion with God, or a kind of Nietzschean perfectionist aestheticism 
(which might even revel in pain), and so forth.9 
 
There would have been no evolutionary benefit to having these beliefs. In 
this case, the sort of utilitarianism de Lazari-Radek and Singer would have 
vindicated would not be idle, but (worse) it would be one that prescribed 
perverse actions. Kahane writes: 
 
if we take the goal of purging all evolutionary influence from our normative 
views seriously enough, we will end up with a view that is so radically divorced 
from common sense, and so distant from any familiar ethical theory, that, by 
comparison, Singer’s own utilitarianism will seem almost like old-fashioned 
common sense.10 
 
Kahane concludes that utilitarians like de Lazari-Radek and Singer should 
not invoke evolutionary debunking arguments. 
                                                
4 De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2012: 16). 
5 Ibid.: 18. 
6 G. Kahane (2014) “Evolution and Impartiality,” Ethics 124: 327-41.  
7 Kahane (2014: 330-31). For simplicity, in what follows I will focus on the belief that pain 
is bad for us (though similar points apply to the belief that pleasure is good for us). 
8 Ibid.: 332. 
9 Ibid.: 334. 
10 Ibid.: 330. 
  3 
In what follows, I will respond to Kahane on behalf of de Lazari-
Radek and Singer. I will argue that Kahane’s crucial premise (i.e., his claim 
that a debunking explanation can easily be given of our beliefs that pleasure 
is good for us and pain is bad for us) is false. On the contrary, these 
evaluative beliefs are the hardest to debunk. The best explanation of them, 
I will claim, is that we form them as a response to seeing that there is 
something worth having in pleasure and something worth avoiding in pain. 
Not only, then, does attention to the origins of our core beliefs about 
wellbeing not undermine the strategy of de Lazari-Radek and Singer, but it 
alsomight vindicate it. 
 
1. The Argument for Kahane’s Premise 
 
Kahane’s key premise is that our core beliefs about wellbeing are “easy 
targets for evolutionary debunking.”11 He makes this claim several times. 
He writes: 
 
many of our evaluative beliefs about well-being, including the beliefs that 
pleasure is good and pain is bad, are some of the most obvious candidates for 
evolutionary debunking.12 
 
And again: 
 
Our evaluative beliefs about pain and pleasure are perhaps the easiest to explain 
in evolutionary terms. It will be hard, at best, to find a serious evolutionary 
theorist who would deny this.13 
 
And again: 
 
If evolution has had any role in shaping our evaluative beliefs, it would be hard 
to deny, to put it mildly, that evolution has played a key role in disposing us to 
see pain as bad, as something we have strong reason to avoid and minimize.14 
 
What is Kahane’s argument for this claim? The only argument he offers is 
one given by Sharon Street. He cites her as follows: 
 
it is of course no mystery whatsoever, from an evolutionary point of view, why 
we and the other animals came to take the sensations associated with bodily 
conditions such as [cuts, burns, bruises, broken bones] to count in favor of what 
would avoid, lessen, or stop them rather than in favor of what would bring about 
and intensify them. One need only imagine the reproductive prospects of a 
creature who relished and sought after the sensations of its bones breaking and 
its tissues tearing; just think how many descendants such a creature would leave 
in comparison to those who happened to abhor and avoid such sensations.15 
 
                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.: 334. Kahane does not cite any evolutionary theorists. 
14 Ibid.: 331. 
15 Street (2006: 150).  
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It is unclear exactly what the argument here is supposed to be. Of course, 
a being who relished and sought after the sensations of its bones breaking and 
tissues tearing would not be very fit, evolutionarily speaking. But how does 
this tend to show that believing that one’s pain is bad for one would have been 
fitness-enhancing? That wanting and seeking one’s pain makes it more likely 
one will be injured has no obvious tendency to show that believing that 
one’s pain is bad for one makes it less likely that one will be injured. 
Let us, then, ignore Street’s claim about relishing and seeking after 
pain, and ask directly: does believing that one’s pain is bad for one make it 
more likely that one will avoid injury?  
The answer, it seems to me, is that it would do so only if one does not 
already hate or have an aversion to one’s own pain. If one already hates one’s own 
pain, then one already has a considerable motive to avoid such pain. 
Coming to additionally believe that one’s pain is bad for one would seem 
to add little or nothing to one’s tendency to avoid such feelings, and so to 
one’s evolutionary fitness. Indeed, in creatures who already hate their own 
pain, adding a belief in the badness for them of pain might, at least in 
certain circumstances, reduce their fitness by leading them to focus 
excessively on immediate pain relief to the exclusion of more important 
things (such as the survival or flourishing of kin or certain long-term 
interests of their own). 
Suppose this is right. A revised debunking argument is nonetheless 
available to Kahane/Street. According to this argument, while the belief 
that one’s pain is bad for one is not itself fitness-enhancing, we have such a 
belief only as a result of our hatred of pain, and we have our hatred of pain only 
because such hatred was fitness-enhancing in our ancestors. If this is true, 
then there does appear to be an effective evolutionary debunking argument 
against the belief that one’s own pain is bad for one. Why do we have this 
belief? Merely as a byproduct of a different state that itself is something we 
have only for its contribution to our fitness. This, indeed, may be the 
argument that Kahane/Street had intended to give all along, but failed to 
put clearly. 
 
2. Evaluating the Argument for Kahane’s Premise 
 
What should we make of this revised argument for Kahane’s premise? I 
will not consider the part of it that says that our belief that pain is bad for 
us is the result of our hatred of pain (though clearly this claim itself needs 
much fleshing out if the argument is to succeed). I want, instead, to focus 
on the part of the argument that says that our hatred of pain is due to the 
usefulness of such hatred in our ancestors. Would such hatred have assisted 
our ancestors in avoiding injury and so surviving and reproducing? 
I think it unlikely that we can explain our hatred of pain in this way. It 
is certainly true that hating pain nowadays (and, more generally, at most 
times in our recent evolutionary history) is useful in avoiding injury. Young 
children, especially, who happen not to hate the feeling of pain certainly 
have a tendency to get injured and die. This is because pain is correlated 
with injury.  
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But why is pain correlated with injury? Why, in other words, is injury 
painful in the first place? Kahane and Street seem to assume that it is simply 
a brute fact that injury is painful. But this might not be so. Perhaps bodily 
injury was not painful in the beginning at all (i.e., in early beings from 
whom we are descended), but only came to be painful for beings like us as 
a result of evolution’s selecting for beings for whom injury merely 
happened (i.e., as a result of random mutation) to be painful. Why would 
evolution have selected for such beings? Perhaps because all beings start out 
with a hatred of their own pain. If all beings start out with a hatred of their own 
pain, then beings who merely happen to feel pain when they are injured 
will naturally do much better than their rivals when it comes to avoiding 
such injury. 
On this account, it was hatred of pain (not the painfulness of injury) 
that was a given, and was what evolution made use of to get beings to more 
effectively stay away from things that could injure them. Evolution, in 
other words, did not make us hate pain by weeding out those who 
happened to be indifferent to or like it. Instead, it made injury painful by 
weeding out those for whom it happened not to be painful. 
Suppose this is true, that bodily damage is painful for us today only 
because our distant ancestors had a preexisting hatred of their own feelings 
of pain. The vital question now is: what explains this preexisting hatred?  
The realist has an intriguing answer. She can say that our hatred of 
pain is in some way a response to pain’s objective badness for us. Perhaps the 
badness for one of pain is a normative fact that is so obvious that any 
creature, even quite basic creatures, can apprehend it (indeed, cannot avoid 
apprehending it). We see that pain is bad for us, and this is why we are all 
inclined to avoid it.16 Alternatively, there is some way in which pain’s 
objective badness for us leads us all to hate pain without it being necessary 
that we realize or apprehend its badness for us.17 
 
3. A Third Possibility 
 
I have outlined two possible orders of explanation. First, there is that of 
Kahane/Street, on which the connection between pain and injury is basic, 
and we have evolved a hatred of pain because such hatred helped our 
ancestors avoid injury. Second, there is the order of explanation I have 
proposed, on which it is our hatred of pain that is basic (and in some way 
a response to pain’s objective badness for us), and evolution selected for 
beings for whom injury merely happened to be painful, thereby leading to 
injury being painful for all of us today. 
                                                
16 As Irwin Goldstein says in connection with this issue, “creatures of elementary 
intelligence are still capable of elementary insights.” See I. Goldstein (1980) “Why People 
Prefer Pleasure to Pain,” Philosophy 55: 357. The suggestion here is not that these animals 
can necessarily think about value, or have evaluative thoughts in anything like a language 
like our own, but just that they can be aware on some level, and in some way, that when 
they are in pain something bad is going on. 
17 A further possibility, it must be conceded, is that there is an explanation of our 
preexisting hatred of pain that appeals neither to its usefulness in evolution nor to its 
objective badness for us. I will not further consider this possibility here. 
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But there is a third possibility I have not yet mentioned. This is that 
neither the connection between pain and injury nor our hatred of pain is 
basic. Instead, these things evolved together, as jointly advantageous.18 What was 
fitness-enhancing was hating something that was correlated with many 
different ways in which one might get injured or have one’s fitness reduced. 
Such hatred of a single object (in this case, a feeling produced by each of 
these threats to one’s fitness) was more efficient, or “cheaper” in 
evolutionary terms, than evolving independent desires to avoid each of 
these different threats. If this third possibility were true, then we would 
have a successful evolutionary debunking explanation of our belief that 
pain is bad for us. 
What should we make of this hypothesis? I cannot fully address it here, 
but I believe it is implausible for the following reason. If the sole function 
of the feeling of pain were to be a feeling we hate, then it seems, at least 
theoretically, that the feeling of pain could have been any old feeling. Any 
feeling at all might equally well have done the job. But this, intuitively, is 
not what we find to be the case. The feeling of pain is qualitatively unlike 
any other feeling, in the following respect: it is one that seems to be in 
some sense worth hating or being averse to. Its aversiveness seems 
somehow to be built into its very nature.  
Now, you might object that this is exactly how we should expect to 
feel about a feeling that was selected for us to be averse to it. We should, 
of course, expect to find it aversive. But there is a difference between 
finding something aversive in the sense merely of wanting it not to occur 
(the only sense in which, on this third possibility, it should be necessary 
that we are averse to the feeling selected to be pain), and finding it aversive 
in the sense in which we find actual pain aversive. Many things we hate, or 
want not to be the case, are not aversive to us in remotely the way that pain 
is aversive to us. Why could the feeling of pain not have had a quality more 
like one of these other things? The peculiar and unique phenomenal quality 
of pain, I am suggesting, gives us some reason to think that it was not 
chosen merely as a “thing for us to hate,” but that we hate it in some sense 
because it merits our hatred. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
What is the upshot? Not only does attention to the origins of our core beliefs 
about wellbeing not undermine the strategy of de Lazari-Radek and Singer, it 
may well vindicate it. The beliefs that pleasure is good for us and pain is bad 
for us may have a firmer foundation than any other evaluative beliefs we have 
– a very firm foundation indeed.  
De Lazari-Radek and Singer claim that the capacity to reason helped us 
to evolve and then, as a side effect, enabled us to recognize normative truths, like 
that of utilitarianism. If I am right, however, our ability to recognize normative 
truths is not only a side effect of the usefulness of our capacity to reason, but 
also an essential part of its usefulness. It was our ability to recognize the goodness 
of pleasure and the badness of pain in the first place that got us wanting 
                                                
18 I am grateful here to an anonymous reviewer for this journal. 
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pleasure and hating pain, the very attitudes that evolution then exploited to 
direct us toward food and away from bodily injury. 
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